COMMENT

PATENT NONUSE AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPRESSION: THE
USE OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING TO PROMOTE PROGRESS

NEIL S. TYLER†
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently and adamantly held that patents do
not require patentees to use or commercialize their inventions. Rather, patents
simply grant inventors the right to exclude others from using or producing their
inventions. That exclusive right, once granted, cannot be taken away because of a
right holder’s failure to work the patent. Great societal harm results, however, when
patentees fail to commercialize their patents or deliberately and strategically suppress
technologies purely for financial gain.
This Comment argues that utilizing compulsory licensing to combat patent
nonuse and technology suppression can help to better achieve the primary goal of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Compulsory licensing that
compensates inventors through reasonable and marketplace-based royalty rates will
ensure that inventors continue to develop and disclose their research and discoveries
to the public. Furthermore, by weakening intellectual property rights on a limited
scale, Congress can ensure that patents are made available to the highest-value
users who can best use these patents to achieve efficient societal innovation and
progress. This Comment therefore questions why patentees are not required to at
least make good faith efforts to practice their patents.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 1787, the State of New York granted John Fitch one of the
most famous state patents ever issued.1 For a fourteen-year term, the
government granted Fitch a legal monopoly and the right to be the sole and
exclusive maker and user of steamboats in New York.2 After only one year,
however, the legislature repealed the grant because Fitch failed to adequately
work the patent.3
Instead of allowing the invention and its technology to enter the public
domain, the legislature subsequently awarded Robert R. Livingston the
exclusive right to the steamboat “for the next 20 years.”4 But over the next
five years, Livingston also failed to produce results that satisfactorily
1 See 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:7 (3d
ed. 1984) (explaining the context and procedural history surrounding Fitch’s original patent “for
the sole and exclusive right and privilege of making and using boats, propelled by fire or steam,
within the waters of New York State,” and subsequently issued patents).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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benefited society.5 Thereafter, in 1803, when Robert Fulton produced the
Clermont,6 a steamboat that encompassed the technology claimed in Livingston’s
patent, New York not only extended the patent for another twenty years,
but also granted both Fulton and Livingston the right to produce
steamboats and exclude others from using the invention.7
At first blush, the steamboat might seem completely irrelevant to modernday patent jurisprudence. Under the Patent Act of 1790, individual states
can no longer grant exclusive patent rights to inventors.8 Today, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is the only agency in the United States
permitted to grant these limited-in-time, government-approved monopolies.9
Furthermore, only under very limited circumstances10 can patent terms be
extended past the internationally standardized term of twenty years.11
However, the New York steamboat patent and the state legislature’s transfer
of patent rights to Livingston and Fulton, high-value users who were more
capable than Fitch of producing steamboats for the benefit of society, serve
as an example of the government’s embrace of the original purpose of
intellectual property rights: to motivate individuals to invent through shortterm economic incentives in order to ensure extensive technological and
societal advancement.12
The Supreme Court has adamantly held that patents do not require that
patentees use or commercialize their inventions.13 Patents simply grant inventors

5
6
7

Id.
Id.
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 510 (N.Y. 1812), overruled by N. River Steamboat Co.
v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (N.Y. 1825).
8 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
9 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing the PTO and listing its powers
and duties).
10 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590-1602 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V
2012)) (allowing up to five years to be restored to a patent to compensate drug patent holders for
marketing time lost while developing the product and awaiting FDA approval).
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (specifying twenty-year U.S. patent
term); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, opened
for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter “TRIPS”] (establishing the international
standard patent term of twenty years for parties to the TRIPS Agreement).
12 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit . . . . [They are] intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
13 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[I]t is the privilege
of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”).
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the right to exclude others from using or producing their inventions.14 That
exclusive right, once granted, cannot be taken away because of a right
holder’s failure to work the patent.15 From an economic and public interest
standpoint, however, would society not benefit from requiring patentees to
at least make good faith efforts to make use of, distribute, or commercialize
their patents? If the government grants an inventor a monopoly, which harms
the marketplace and consumer welfare,16 what is wrong with requiring
recipients of this exclusive right to actively promote the progress of the
sciences and useful arts for the benefit of society?
No one would argue that the federal government should take the steps
the New York state legislature took when it revoked John Fitch’s patent after
only one year of efforts. The government should not strip a patentee of his
property rights and then arbitrarily reissue the patent to a different individual.
Neither should the invention fall into the public domain if nonworking of
the patent is proven. Rather, the United States should embrace the ideals and
goals of patent law the New York legislature typified when it transferred the
steamboat patent to a higher-value user—even if the methods it used in that
redistribution of rights were ill-advised.
As established in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the primary goal of patent law is to advance the public
interest and achieve societal progress as efficiently as possible.17 Similarly,
international trade agreements and the vast majority of foreign nations have
recognized the great societal harms associated with nonworking of patents
and suppression of technology.18 Mechanisms such as compulsory licensing,
whereby “the state requires a patent holder to license his patent to another,”19
could combat patent nonuse and technology suppression and help achieve
the goals outlined in the U.S. Constitution. A limited use of compulsory
licensing that compensates inventors through reasonable and marketplacebased royalty rates will continue to incentivize inventors to develop and

14 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”).
15 Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 429-30.
16 For a simplified discussion of the costs associated with monopolies, see Tejvan R. Pettinger,
Disadvantages of a Monopoly, ECONOMICS HELP, http://www.economicshelp.org/microessays/markets/
monopoly-diagram.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (establishing intellectual property rights “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).
18 See infra Part III.
19 Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1275, 1276.
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disclose their research and discoveries to the public.20 Meanwhile, compulsory
licensing will help ensure that the highest-value users—like Livingston and
Fulton—rather than just the inventors themselves, will once again be
permitted to use and commercialize new and progressive technologies to
benefit society.
Part I of this Comment describes the constitutional foundation of the
U.S. patent system and its purpose in granting monopolies to inventors in
exchange for disclosure of their inventions. Part II then discusses the
perverse incentives that patents may provide to inventors. It focuses on the
societal problems that often arise when companies suppress technologies
and the reasons why it might be advantageous for an inventor to decide not
to work her patent. Part III examines international patent laws and the use
of compulsory licensing throughout the world. Part IV discusses the history
of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence and analyzes the reasons why
compulsory licensing of patents has not been implemented in the United
States. Finally, Part V argues for a limited use of compulsory licensing in
the United States to exclusively address nonworking of patents and strategic
suppression of inventions. A detailed structure is proposed that would
ensure the original constitutional purpose of patents is better achieved.
I. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries.”21 For centuries, exclusive patent rights have been granted to
inventors for the benefit of the public. But intellectual property rights have
continued to evolve and rise in importance as the world has shifted toward
an increasingly knowledge-based economy.
The grant of a patent comes with no affirmative duty on the part of the
patent holder to use or commercialize the technology described in the
patent’s claims.22 Instead, the patentee, after disclosing her invention, has
the right to exclude others from using or commercializing the technology.23
20 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 406-07 (2010) (“[I]n
many cases, inventors would actually benefit from a fixed, low royalty rate, because it would set an
enforceable reserve price for the invention.”).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428-30 (1908) (“[E]xclusion
may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”).
23 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (prohibiting the unauthorized use of a “patented
invention during the term of the patent”); Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices:
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But patent rights and government-granted monopolies are a means to an
end: patents are designed to spur research, development, and inventiveness
for the benefit of society.24 The ability to extract monopoly prices is an
acceptable evil intended to advance technological development.25 The
system is thus in constant tension: patents do not force rights holders to
take any affirmative steps to work their patents, but permitting patentees to
choose not to work their government-granted monopolies thwarts the
Constitution’s stated goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”26
II. HOW PATENTS CAN THWART SOCIETAL PROGRESS
In recent years, the international intellectual property community has
discussed at length patent law’s perceived shortcomings in relation to the
pharmaceutical industry. Developed and developing nations have fought
bitterly over the consequences of granting entities monopoly rights for lifesaving drugs and necessary medicines.27 Communities devastated by AIDS
and other debilitating diseases have argued passionately that it is abhorrent
on a moralistic level for pharmaceutical companies to value profit over
thousands, or even millions, of lives.28
Preventing Technology Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
397, 401-02 (2004) (“[P]atents give inventors monopolistic power to prevent non-patentees from
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention.”).
24 For one of the most revered discussions of the true purpose of patent rights, see Justice
Douglas’s dissent in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-84 (1945) (“It is a mistake . . . to
conceive of a patent as but another form of private property. The patent is a privilege conditioned
by a public purpose.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
25 See Amie N. Broder, Comparing Apples to APPLs: Importing the Doctrine of Adverse Possession
in Real Property to Patent Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 557, 569 (2007) (“While ensuring
patentees recoup the costs of innovating through a right to exclude others from using one’s patent
is also a motivation behind the patent system, the foremost justification for exclusion rights has
always been ‘generating incentives to create.’” (citation omitted)).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27 For a more detailed discussion of patent issues related to the pharmaceutical industry and
the advantages and disadvantages of using compulsory licensing to address international medical
concerns, see generally Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada
and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 222 (2009).
28 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289 (recognizing that patent protection for drugs can cause
prices to skyrocket, which decreases their availability and thereby harms people in developing
countries who may suffer from life-threatening but treatable diseases); Dee Hon, Battles with Big
Pharma, ADBUSTERS, Aug. 15, 2007, available at http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/73/Battles_with_
Big_Pharma.html (discussing how, with the support of former President Bill Clinton, “Thailand
and Brazil began overriding the patents for a costly new AIDS medicine from Merck”). For a
discussion of how even the United States considered a form of compulsory licensing of “any
invention relating to health care” in response to the Anthrax scare of 2001, see Kirby W. Lee,
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Whether compulsory licensing should be used to combat the exorbitant
prices pharmaceutical companies often charge during a drug’s patent term is
outside the scope of this Comment.29 Rather, this Comment’s main focus is
situations in which a patentee fails to work her patent or consciously
suppresses potentially beneficial technologies to the public’s detriment.
Such purely financial decisions could hinder efficient progress of the arts and
sciences and may even deprive society of life-changing advancements for
decades, until the patents expire.
A. Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression
Patent law assumes that patentees will exploit their patents in order to
benefit financially from government-granted monopoly rights. Studies
estimate, however, that between forty and ninety percent of issued patents
are never used or licensed by their owners during their terms.30 By weakening
intellectual property rights on a limited scale, Congress can ensure that
patents are made available to the highest-value users who can help achieve
efficient societal innovation and progress.31
“Patent nonuse occurs when a patentee fails to commercialize its patent,”
which may happen for a number of reasons.32 Some patents simply “ha[ve]
no present commercial value.”33 Sometimes licensing negotiations with
competitors or strategic partners will not be mutually beneficial and will
ultimately fail.34 Under these circumstances, the market seems to be signaling
that these patents are not worth the expense and effort of commercialization.
Note, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in the United States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not Merit
Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REV. 175, 175-76 (2003). For a more thorough discussion of
compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals under TRIPS, see generally Jon Matthews, Renewing
Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most
Damaging to the United States Healthcare Industry, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 119 (2010).
29 For one analysis of this question, see Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the
Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 8083 (2011), arguing that a compulsory licensing regime for pharmaceutical patents is untenable
because it would leave pharmaceutical companies unable to cover the fixed costs of developing and
distributing new drugs.
30 See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology
Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391 n.10 (2002) (citing numerous sources and studies that
estimate the percentage of unused patents in practice).
31 See Broder, supra note 25, at 569 (arguing that intellectual property rights given to an inventor
should be only as strong as necessary to spur subsequent innovation).
32 Saunders, supra note 30, at 391-92.
33 Id. at 391. But see Sichelman, supra note 20, at 344 (noting that, according to one survey,
though “40% of the patents held by respondents were uncommercialized[,] . . . 32% of these
patents were either commercially ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’” (citation omitted)).
34 See id. at 391-92.
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But patent nonuse can also arise from anticompetitive and strategic behaviors,
where patentees deliberately suppress products or processes from the
market to benefit financially.35
The past century is rife with examples of powerful companies making
strategic decisions that, for decades, deprived society of key advancements
in technology.36 Technology suppression and patent nonuse occur not only
through strategic decisions made by original patent holders, but also by
companies, threatened by new patented technologies, that wish to block
their entry into the marketplace by acquiring the patent rights through
licensing.37
A company may choose to resist radical innovations it perceives as a
threat to the status quo, or new developments that may disrupt its industry
power and prestige.38 A company’s shelved patent may have more economic
value because the company can generate more revenue from litigationenforced patent licensing than by marketing the patented technology.39
Patentees may also choose to block or fence a core technology by patenting
potential market substitutes that competing companies could otherwise
produce.40 Lastly, companies may seek to avoid political or labor union backlash
by suppressing “new technolog[ies] that will de-skill or displace workers.”41
B. Consequences and Solutions
Proponents of strong intellectual property rights point to the quid pro
quo that patent law represents: in exchange for disclosure, patent holders
35
36

See id. at 392.
See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 343 (“[M]any of the twentieth century’s greatest inventions,
including the television, radio, radar, and penicillin, were not commercialized until decades after
they were invented.”).
37 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 414, 418-22 (explaining how exclusive licensees can “lock
away the invention by refusing to use the patent or develop and commercialize the invention” and
discussing numerous ways and reasons that licensees may strategically suppress patents).
38 See JAMES DYSON, AGAINST THE ODDS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 247-49 (2d ed. 2001)
(explaining that a company may purchase or license a patent to “take it off the shelf to make sure
nobody else uses it”); cf. Sichelman, supra note 20, at 364 (citing a European Commission survey
of over 9000 European inventors finding thirty-eight percent of patents were unused by the
inventors or licensed to other entities despite the majority of the patents being deemed valuable or
important).
39 See Jeff John Roberts, Patent Troll Says It Owns GPS, Sues Foursquare, GIGAOM (July 26, 2012,
4:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/07/26/patent-troll-says-it-owns-gps-sues-foursquare (discussing a
notable recent example of a “non-practicing entity” acquiring and enforcing patents through a
strategic suit).
40 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 344 (“Because early patent grants reward the best inventor,
but not necessarily the best commercializer, broad claims can impose unwarranted burdens on thirdparty commercializers.”).
41 Saunders, supra note 30, at 419-20.
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have the unfettered right to choose whether, when, and how their property
will be used.42 But, the primary purpose of patent law according to the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution is to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts—not to provide maximum economic compensation
for rights holders.43 Considering the example of Liggett & Myers Company,
which patented a way to remove the majority of carcinogens from cigarette
smoke during the 1960s and suppressed it until 2001, it is extremely difficult
to argue that the conscious sacrifice of millions of lives over several decades
was a reasonable tradeoff for protecting the strength and profitability of the
cigarette industry.44
Scholars, therefore, have recognized the law’s failure to “consider seriously
or to respond to the problem of technology suppression.”45 Consumers incur
welfare losses when rights holders suppress beneficial patents or neglect to
use them over their terms. This can delay or even preclude the public’s
enjoyment of new technologies and progressive inventions.46 Additionally,
patent suppression can hinder or prevent incremental innovations and
improvements to original inventions that could otherwise lead to important
discoveries and developments.47
Nevertheless, Congress has, for the most part, chosen to ignore our patent
system’s perverse incentives for businesses, establishing that intentional
nonuse of a patent by its owner or licensee is not an actionable misuse of
patent rights.48 But in recent years, it seems several Supreme Court Justices
have begun to recognize the dangers inherent in the patent system’s right of
exclusion with no requirement of production.49 In certain circumstances,
they have recommended damages in lieu of injunctions to combat the

42 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 377-78 (noting that “disclosure is the ‘quid pro quo of the
right to exclude,’” but observing that “there is relatively little social value to disclosure as an end in
itself: technical knowledge put to no use is not worth much” (citation omitted)).
43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 393-95 (discussing the strategic considerations of cigarette
companies that suppressed such research and patents for over thirty years). For another situation
in which technology suppression harmed the public, see id. at 395-96, in which the author
discusses how Amgen suppressed “a wonderful advance that could save hundreds of thousands of
children from anemia and death” to preserve the market for their lucrative but less effective
patented drug.
45 Id. at 396.
46 Id. at 419.
47 Id.
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006) (declaring that it is not patent misuse to “refus[e] to
license or use any rights to the patent”).
49 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for production and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”).
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detrimental effects of patent holdups in various sectors of society.50 As the
international community further shifts toward a knowledge-based economy,
thus relying on intellectual property to a greater extent, compulsory licensing
should be employed more readily as a means of social engineering to better
promote technology competition and innovation.51
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR PATENTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA
The majority of WTO member nations have more fully embraced and
utilized compulsory licensing than the United States has, permitting
compulsory licensing of patents in international trade agreements.52 Under
Article 5 of the Paris Convention, member countries may grant compulsory
licenses to prevent abuses that may result from a patent holder’s exercise of
exclusive patent rights.53 The grant of a nonexclusive compulsory license to
entities that intend to use the patent in the domestic market, therefore, is
meant to combat abusive patent practices, including the failure of a patent
holder to work a patent.54
Article 5 of the Paris Convention, however, establishes that a compulsory
license cannot be issued for failure to work a patent for at least four years
after the patent application is filed or three years after the patent is issued.55
The compulsory license can be denied if the patentee provides legitimate
legal, economic, or technical reasons for nonuse.56 In essence, compulsory
licenses are available under the Paris Convention to encourage use of
inventions in domestic markets and to ensure that the public is not prevented
from benefiting from new and progressive technologies and inventions.57

50
51

See id.; see also infra Section IV.B.
See generally Saunders, supra note 30, at 397, 434-49 (discussing why compulsory licensing
of patent rights is in the public interest).
52 Id. at 438; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A)(2)–
(4), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention] (providing for the issuance of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses).
53 See id.
54 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 436-37.
55 Paris Convention, supra note 52, at art. 5(A)(4).
56 Id.
57 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 436-37 (“The Convention makes clear that the purpose of having
a compulsory licensing statute is to protect intellectual property from being suppressed or neglected
within the country of interest simply because the owner is unwilling or unable to exploit it.”).

2014]

Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression

461

A. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
In 1993, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade established the TRIPS Agreement,58 which ultimately led to the
adoption of the twenty-year patent term in the United States.59 More
important, however, it acknowledged that member countries are permitted
to use certain patents without the rights holder’s authorization, within
limits, when necessary “to protect public health and nutrition, . . . to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance . . . [, and] to prevent
the abuse of intellectual property rights.”60 Such abuse may include a patentee’s
imposition of unreasonable terms or engagement in practices that could
“adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”61
TRIPS does place some limits on compulsory licensing: “Members may
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of
third parties.”62 Specifically, a compulsory license is grantable, in addition to
other requirements, if (1) authorization is considered on the individual
merits; (2) the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the
patentee on reasonable commercial terms, and such efforts have failed
within a reasonable period of time; (3) the compulsory license is nonexclusive
and nonassignable; (4) it is primarily for use in the domestic market; and
(5) the patentee receives “adequate remuneration” based on the economic
value of the nonexclusive license that is to be granted.63 Further, the “legal
validity” of any decision authorizing unlicensed use of a patented invention
and establishing the requisite royalty rate must be subject to judicial review
or other independent review in the member state’s jurisdiction.64
B. International Use and Acceptance of Compulsory Licensing
Consistent with the provisions of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement, “the overwhelming majority of countries that belong to the
[WTO] have enacted compulsory licensing as part of their patent laws.”65
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

See generally TRIPS, supra note 11.
Yosick, supra note 19, at 1285.
TRIPS, supra note 11, at art. 8.
Id.
Id. at art. 30.
Id. at art. 31(a), (b), (e), (f) & (h).
See id. at art. 31(i)–(j).
Saunders, supra note 30, at 438-39.
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Additionally, “some countries resort to compulsory licensing as a remedy for
antitrust or misuse.”66 Countries have turned to compulsory licensing for
food, medicine, and other patents to overcome such market failures as rights
holders blocking dependent or improvement patents through
anticompetitive or strategic company behavior or refusing altogether to
work or license their patents.67 These countries have permitted compulsory
licensing for these types of inventions for a variety of reasons: “to protect
national security by ensuring an adequate supply of medicine, especially to
combat devastating diseases like AIDS; to avoid the high costs of new drugs
which developing countries cannot afford; and to encourage the retention of
scientists and the development of a local pharmaceutical industry.”68
Further, powerful and developed countries such as the United Kingdom
permit compulsory licensing in a variety of situations outside the
pharmaceutical context. Such licensing is permitted when a patentee refuses
to license its patent on reasonable terms or its refusal to license prejudices
“the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in
the United Kingdom.”69 In Japan, compulsory licensing is permitted when a
patent has not been worked for three years and where working is “particularly
necessary for the public interest.”70 As the Indian pharmaceutical industry
developed, compulsory licensing was utilized to encourage the local working
of inventions for the benefit of the domestic economy.71 Lastly, Germany
continues to allow compulsory licensing if “(1) the person seeking a license
has unsuccessfully endeavored during a reasonable period of time to obtain
from the patentee consent to use the invention under reasonable conditions
usual in trade; and (2) public interest commands the grant of a compulsory

66 Id. For more information regarding the U.S. patent misuse doctrine, see generally 35
U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
67 See Black, supra note 23, at 404 (“[M]any countries will allow compulsory licensing for
certain technologies related to food production and drugs . . . .”); cf. id. at 429-30 (discussing the
failure of market solutions with respect to licensing in the life sciences industry).
68 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289; see also Black, supra note 23, at 401 (“Unlike the United
States, these societies weigh the social right to use certain forms of technologies more heavily than
a patentee’s right to deny the technology to the public.”).
69 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48(a)(3)(d) (U.K.).
70 [Tokkyohō] [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959 (as amended up to Act No. 63 of 2011), art.
83, para. 1, art. 93, para. 1 (Japan) translated in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION LEX, available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=299486.
71 For a more thorough discussion of India’s use of compulsory licensing and the changes that
have resulted from TRIPS, see Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 290-92 (2006) (“The compulsory license provision and the government’s
ability to issue licenses of right were meant to facilitate local manufacturing of inventions.”).
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license.”72 Compulsory licenses will be granted to “ensure an adequate
supply of the patented product to the domestic market” where, in addition
to the above criteria, the “patentee does not work the patented invention or
does not work it predominantly in Germany.” 73 Most WTO countries, in fact,
have recognized the importance and benefits of using compulsory licensing to
correct market failures and ensure the efficient progression of society.74
C. The United States’ Reaction
United States industry participants have adamantly opposed the use of
compulsory licensing, claiming that if governments allow compulsory licenses
to be issued, companies will be incapable of recouping the billions of dollars
spent on the research and development necessary for innovation and
production.75 Despite acceptance of compulsory licensing in limited
circumstances by the vast majority of WTO members, the U.S. Congress
has several times attempted and failed to pass a general compulsory
licensing bill.76 In 1973, the Hart Bill was proposed, which not only would
have established the foundation for compulsory licensing of patents related
to “public health, safety, energy, or protection of the environment,” but also
would have granted a compulsory license for any patent that went unworked
within three years of issuance or within four years of the application’s filing
date.77 This bill, as well as many other proposals in recent years, ultimately
failed in the face of strong opposition from technology-heavy industries and
patent practitioners.78 As a result, Congress continues to neglect the
problems of technology suppression and unworked patents.79
72 See Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May 5, 1936, BGBL. I, last amended by Gesetz [G],
Jul. 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2521, art. 24 (Ger.), translated in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION LEX, available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=238776.
73 Id.
74 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289-90.
75 See id. at 1276 (“Although common in other countries, including Japan, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, [compulsory licensing] is rarely applied in the United States.”). But see Black,
supra note 23, at 403 (explaining that, in the United States, “the government may ‘march-in’ if a
producer cannot meet the public health needs,” and that “doctors and hospitals are granted
immunity from damages for infringing medical patents used to care for patients”).
76 Saunders, supra note 30, at 439-40.
77 See S. 814, 94th Cong. § 7 (1975) (declaring it “an unfair act or practice . . . for the owner of
a United States patent, or any licensee having sublicensing rights thereunder, to refuse or fail to
license such patent . . . to any applicant in the United States on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, when the effect of such refusal or failure may be substantially to lessen actual or potential
commerce”); see also Yosick, supra note 19 at 1278 (discussing the opposition to and failure of the
Hart Bill and similar legislation).
78 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1278.
79 See id. at 1278-79 (chronicling the absence of compulsory licensing legislation).
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IV. U.S. OPPOSITION TO COMPULSORY LICENSING
While the United States has turned to compulsory licensing in certain
limited circumstances, the government has generally abhorred the limiting
of intellectual property rights and patent monopolies.80 Critics of compulsory
licensing argue that the threat of compelled use and the weakening of patent
rights would reduce individuals’ and companies’ incentives to develop and
disclose new inventions for the benefit of society.81 They fear that the main
purpose of the patent system, to promote innovation and encourage
disclosure of inventions, would be undermined.82 Additional arguments
against compulsory licensing have ranged from claims that there is no
evidence of wrongful suppression of patented technology under the current
system to characterization of compulsory licensing as “socialism run
rampant.”83 Some even believe that compulsory licensing “strikes at the very
foundation of the patent system.”84
However, numerous studies have cast doubt on these critiques and
predictions.85 Some scholars have noted that compulsory licensing can
80 See id. at 1277 (“The U.S. patent system has generally been hostile toward the practice of
compulsory licensing.”).
81 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 438 n.289 (“The premise here is that invention and innovation
would be reduced without the reward of a twenty-year term of exclusivity. . . . [T]his position is
bound closely with the linkage of patent protection to property rights theory.”); Yosick, supra note
19, at 1291-92 (discussing arguments that compulsory licensing would discourage innovation by
decreasing the return on investment, and would encourage secrecy to avoid licensing).
82 As Professor Oppenheimer explained,

The fundamental exchange required by utility patent law is the inventor’s surrender
of a trade secret in exchange for the patent, promoting progress . . . by putting the
public in possession of information that the inventor could have withheld and giving
the inventor the incentive of an assured term of exclusive control over the invention.
Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 269, 285 (2010) (citations omitted).
83 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1278 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
84 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY NO. 12, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS—A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 9-10 (Comm. Print 1958).
85 See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
(1977) (discussing the economic impact of compulsory patent licensing schemes on businesses);
F.M. Scherer, Comment, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 104, 105-108 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds.,
1998) (analyzing the relationship between R&D expenditures and compulsory licensing and
finding that, contrary to expectations, there was “a statistically significant elevation of . . . R&D”
in “companies subjected to compulsory licensing”); see also Yosick, supra note 19, at 1292 (explaining
that the arguments that compulsory licensing would erode the foundation of the patent system,
“however, overestimate the effects of a compulsory licensing system and would occur only in a
system that grants licenses very liberally”). But see C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 349-50 (1973) (concluding that a narrowly tailored
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actually provide a strong incentive for patentees and interested licensees to
better use patents that otherwise would not be commercialized.86
Additionally, not only can compulsory licensing serve a market-channeling
function, but it also prevents high transaction costs and bilateral monopolies
from thwarting beneficial technology transactions. A limited and controlled
threat of compulsory licensing could encourage parties to eventually come
to an agreement themselves rather than resort to costly litigation or
nonworking of the patent.87 The Atomic Energy Act contains a provision
for compulsory licensing of inventions in the public interest related to
atomic energy,88 and the Clean Air Act contains a similar provision for
inventions related to air pollution. 89 Thus, it seems that legislators are open to
considering compulsory licensing when the provisions are narrowly tailored and
for the public interest.
A. The Development of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence
Nineteenth-century courts recognized and embraced compulsory licensing
for patents in a wide array of circumstances. Early federal court decisions
recognized that “under a patent which gives a patentee a monopoly, he is
bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable
or equitable terms.”90 Focusing on the primary purpose of patents, other
courts recognized that a patentee that “refuses to allow others to make
useful [inventions] is not within the spirit of the provision of the constitution
which assigns as a reason for securing exclusive rights to authors and
inventors a desire to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”91
When the issue finally reached the Supreme Court in the early twentieth
century, however, a landmark decision validated patent nonuse as a legitimate

compulsory licensing regime would slightly discourage patenting and disclosure and would have
only a marginal impact on the U.K. economy, while significantly lowering R&D across several
sectors of the economy).
86 Saunders, supra note 30, at 441 (noting that compulsory licensing “may also introduce dynamic
efficiencies by reducing expenditures on uneconomic invent-around R&D”); Yosick, supra note 19
at 1293-1301 (arguing that compulsory licensing would be particularly effective at encouraging
domestic use of patents and resolving “blocking patents”).
87 See Yosick, supra note 19 at 1293-98 (discussing the societal consequences incurred when
parties with overlapping patent claims fail to effectuate beneficial transactions or resort to
litigation to settle licensing disputes).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
89 Id. § 7608 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
90 Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886).
91 Ewart Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin Cycle-Chain Co., 91 F. 262, 265 (D. Mass. 1898) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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exercise of patent rights.92 In subsequent decades, the Court consistently
recognized that a patentee is not obligated to use or allow others to use a
patent.93 Over the past century, American companies have strategically
utilized patents to suppress competing technologies that could have potentially
changed the way consumers live.94 Toward the latter part of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court suggested that the public interest may provide
a basis for compulsory licensing, but this occurred in the unique context of
antitrust violations.95 The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission often condition approval of large mergers on the
licensing of certain patents to competitors.96 However, for the most part,
patent suppression and nonuse has become an accepted intellectual property
practice, despite its potential to drastically harm the public.
B. Signs of Hope
With the recent international expansion of patent rights and the United
States’ position at the forefront of intellectual property rights development,
several Supreme Court Justices have revealed a newfound recognition of the
dangers inherent in the U.S. patent system.97 One such danger stems from
92

The Supreme Court explained,
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent,
we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the
right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or
not use it, without question of motive.

Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
93 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) (“[A patentee]
has no obligation either to use [the patent] or to grant its use to others.”); Special Equipment Co.
v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945) (“This Court has consistently held that failure of the patentee
to make use of a patented invention does not affect the validity of the patent.”); Woodbridge v.
United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55 (1923) (noting that “a patentee is not obliged either to make, use or
vend his invention during the period of his monopoly” (citations omitted)); Crown Die & Tool
Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923) (asserting as a “clearly established
principle[]” the idea that Congress has not placed an “express statutory imposition upon the
patentee . . . to make, use or vend his patented invention as a condition of receiving his patent”).
94 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 358 (explaining the dangers of technology suppression,
noting that “[i]f an original patentee can block subsequent product improvements by others, there
will be diminished ex ante incentives for others” to innovate and provide new products to
consumers).
95 See generally United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (recognizing compulsory
licensing at reasonable royalty rates as a permissible antitrust remedy).
96 Saunders, supra note 30, at 447.
97 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that injunctive relief may not always serve the public interest because “[a]n
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”).
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the numerous nonpracticing entities that have profited greatly over the past
few decades. Nonpracticing entities do not bring products to market; rather,
they derive revenue from patents by enforcing their intellectual property
rights against alleged infringers.98 As a result, patent holdups99 have
increasingly affected technology-heavy industries, as nonpracticing entities
threaten and coerce parties into licensing patents or exiting the market to
avoid engaging in costly, high-stakes litigation.100
Courts have therefore begun to embrace the wide discretion available to
them in remedying patent infringement. Until the early twenty-first
century, courts in the vast majority of circumstances granted permanent
injunctions for patent infringement, whether or not the patentee had been
using or commercializing the invention.101 But following the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,102 federal courts have
begun adopting a compulsory license doctrine that largely follows the
Second Circuit and Justice Kennedy’s concurring approach.103
The eBay majority decision established that courts should apply the
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief in cases of patent
infringement.104 Of particular note is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which
advocates strongly against automatically affirming a patentee’s absolute right
to exclude through injunctions in cases of nonpracticing patentees.105 When
patent holders attempt to leverage the threat of a court-issued injunction
into a presuit settlement, Kennedy urges courts instead to grant damages of
98 See Broder, supra note 25, at 572 (“[Nonpracticing] entities arguably invest nothing in the
innovation, except the cost of acquiring the patent and the cost of pursuing potential infringers.”).
99 Patent holdups occur when companies cannot produce certain products because they “read
on” a patent that the patentee refuses to license. Troy L. Gwartney, Note, Harmonizing the
Exclusionary Rights of Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1403 (2009);
see also id. at 1436 (citing study results finding that “[n]onpracticing entities file 30-40% of all
patent suits in the computing and electronics industries” (alteration in original)).
100 See generally eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101 See id. at 391 (majority opinion) (noting the “general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances” (quoting MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
102 547 U.S. 388.
103 See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (approving a
reasonable royalty award and vacating an injunction); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *11-15 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (determining that a reasonable royalty
would be adequate compensation and refusing to assume irreparable harm for an injunction); see
also Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange,
14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31 (2009) (“These courts have decided, though not always expressly, that
a nonpracticing patentee is entitled only to the royalty it would have earned had the parties
executed a license . . . .”).
104 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-93.
105 See id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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reasonable royalties.106 In response to Justice Kennedy and others’ belief
that royalties and damages may be sufficient to adequately compensate
aggrieved patentees, lower courts, including the Federal Circuit,107 have
begun to embrace compulsory licensing by regularly denying injunctive relief
to nonworking patent holders.108
The Supreme Court thus signaled that strategic and detrimental patent
enforcement behavior should not be tolerated when it stands in sharp
opposition to the public interest. This Comment contends that compulsory
licensing can ensure that individuals will still be compensated for their
investments and inventive labor through the establishment of a reasonable
royalty rate, while efficient commercialization practices and increased use of
emerging technologies will benefit society.109 It may be wise for the federal
government to heed the Supreme Court’s wisdom, as well as the practices of
the majority of foreign nations, and recognize the value of compulsory
licensing in today’s world.
V. COMPULSORY LICENSING TO ENSURE SOCIETAL PROGRESS
The incentives created by the patent system and the public’s interest in
technological progress and competition must be better aligned. The United
States’ acceptance and limited use of compulsory licensing serves as a
powerful example of the proper way to limit a patentee’s right to exclude.
Congress, therefore, should reorient its view of patent law and once again
focus on the development of science and the useful arts while protecting the
proper incentive level for inventors.110

106
107

Id.
See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction
may be appropriate.”).
108 For a further discussion of the lower courts’ decisions embracing this approach, see
Venkatesan, supra note 103, at 39-40. See also Daniel J. Iden, Note, Combating Joint Ventures in
Suppression: Taking Inventory of the Legal Arsenal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 278, 290-91 (2011) (noting that
“consideration of public interest when . . . determining whether or not to apply a compulsory
licensing regime . . . seems to have found some traction among courts, at least in effect,” following
eBay).
109 Cf. Sichelman, supra note 20, at 363 (“[A]bout only 5% of issued patents are licensed for a
royalty. . . . These low rates of licensing . . . are further evidence of under-commercialization.”).
110 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1300-01 (“It is important that compulsory licensing be allowed
only where truly necessary to promote the public interest, while not significantly reducing the
incentive to develop new technology.”).
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A. The Benefits of Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing should be imposed in only limited circumstances—
specifically, where overwhelming hardship to the public outweighs the
benefits to the patent holder. The threat and actual imposition of a reasonable
and equitable royalty rate can help overcome the high transaction costs,
bilateral monopolies, and psychological failures that often prevent parties
from reaching agreements.111 Therefore, when patent holders fail to
commercialize their intellectual property after a reasonable period of time,
such patents should be subject to compulsory licensing for the benefit of
society.112
Patentees who are unable or unwilling to acquire the resources necessary
to bring the product to market or fail to find a suitable licensee should be
subject to the market-forcing mechanism of compulsory licensing. Not only
would products that would otherwise be shelved or suppressed for the
patent term come to market, but they would presumably be offered at more
competitive prices. The mere threat of compulsory licensing for nonuse
would likely reduce the incidence of patent suppression and nonworking by
persuading entities to overcome conflicts and issue licenses based on their
own price valuations.113
Critics may argue that compulsory licensing would reduce investment in
innovation by defeating inventors’ ability to extract monopoly profits. But
compulsory licensing would occur only in a very limited number of
circumstances and only when a patentee is unable or unwilling to bring the
invention to market. The ex ante incentive to invent should therefore
remain strong, as few inventors consciously research, develop, and patent
inventions with an already-established desire to suppress the product for the full
patent term.114 With compulsory licensing for the remainder of the patent term,
111 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Note that TRIPS requires companies to have
already attempted to obtain a license from the patentee before a compulsory license can be issued.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
112 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 406-07 (“If the invention patentee or a licensee did not
commercialize by . . . roughly five to eight years after filing[ ]it seems difficult to argue that
providing that opportunity to a third party willing to do so under a low, but reasonable, royalty
prejudices the patentee.”).
113 See Eric Bond & Kamal Saggi, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, and Access to Patented
Foreign Products 4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 12-00006, 2012), available at
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-12-00006.pdf (“[C]ompulsory licensing need
not actually be used: the threat to issue a compulsory license can affect the behavior of patentholders . . . .”).
114 Cf., e.g., Richard Tyler, Inventor Fury as Patents Prove Too Costly to Defend, TELEGRAPH
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9130815/Inventor-fury-as-patentsprove-too-costly-to-defend.html (quoting a technology broker who explained that he had “come to
the view that the only reason [small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)] should seek a patent
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rights holders would continue to reap the fruits of their labor by recouping at
least some of the costs incurred during research and development.115 In fact,
establishing competitive rates without engaging in costly negotiations and
incurring other transaction costs with interested licensees may lead to
greater net profits for inventors.116
B. Proposed Framework
To ensure fairness and stability, patents should not be subject to the
threat of compulsory licensing until patentees have been given a reasonable
opportunity to use, commercialize, license, or assign their patents for use in the
marketplace. Based on the pharmaceutical industry’s passionate arguments that
compulsory licensing undermines the ability to recoup the billions of dollars
spent on research and development of new drugs, compulsory licensing should
not be considered for the first eight years of the patent term. This safehaven period would be granted to all patents, no matter the industry, and
would actually be much longer than the time limitations placed on
compulsory licensing by certain countries under TRIPS.117
After eight years, companies should be required to file a short document
or statement detailing efforts to use, develop, or commercialize the patent,
by either the original patent holder or a licensee.118 This report could be
filed at the same time as payment of the patent’s maintenance fees. Under
the current structure, fees are due at the three-, seven-, and eleven-year
marks.119 But to better align fees with the proposed compulsory licensing
framework, I recommend that both the fees and the evidence necessary to
avoid compulsory licensing should be due during the eighth, eleventh,
fourteenth, and seventeenth years of the patent term.

is to create something that can be traded—hopefully to an entity who can afford to sue those who
infringe it—unless the SME has deep pockets and limitless stamina”).
115 See Iden, supra note 108, at 298-99 (“One of the most compelling reasons for courts to
assign compulsory licenses in cases of technology suppression is that it would make the patent
available for public consumption and development while still compensating the patentee.”).
116 See id. at 299 (“Since others can develop or use the invention, the public is able to reap
any social good able to be derived from the patent. . . . [C]ompulsory licenses might represent a
reasonable compromise among the patentee, licensee, and the social good.” (footnote omitted)); see
also Sichelman, supra note 20, at 406-07 (“[I]n many cases, inventors would actually benefit from a
fixed, low royalty rate, because it would set an enforceable reserve price for the invention, which
would reduce strategic negotiation and overall bargaining costs, increasing the odds of consummating
a deal.”).
117 See supra Section III.B.
118 For a discussion of the implications of an annual reporting requirement or disclosure and
justification to the public of nonuse, see Saunders, supra note 30, at 427-30.
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006).
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The PTO would have to review these materials, which admittedly would
add a heavy burden to an already overloaded system.120 To cover this
additional cost, maintenance fees should be increased above their current
rates and increase with each payment period.
Upon review, the PTO would make a decision concerning whether the
patent has been sufficiently worked or whether the inventor is making an
effort to bring the product to market. Should the evidence submitted not
meet the necessary level of proof, the PTO would refer the matter to a
specialized board for a hearing to determine whether compulsory licensing
should issue and at what rate. This would provide patentees with the
TRIPS-required judicial review, as well as allow further evidence and expert
testimony to be submitted regarding the working of the patent.
The specialized board could be created either under the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or as a separate entity to deal
exclusively with compulsory licensing issues. In fact, copyright law took the
latter approach when the Librarian of Congress appointed three fulltime
Copyright Royalty Judges to the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) to
determine compulsory licensing rates for certain works.121
Critics and patentees may argue that third parties and specialized boards
will be unable to determine reasonable and fair royalty rates, or that patentees
and interested licensees are better evaluators of the worth of patents.122
Justice Kennedy, with three other Justices joining his concurrence, however,
opined that “legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement,” suggesting that courts are capable of determining and
imposing reasonable royalty rates in a variety of contexts, including patent
infringement suits.123 If a CRB-type board is established for patent compulsory
licensing, greater expertise is likely to be developed. Specialized judges
120 See Andrew Brandt, Patent Overload Hampers Tech Innovation, PCWORLD (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/124826/article.html (discussing the severe patent backlog facing
the U.S. PTO).
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006) (outlining types of transmissions subject to compulsory
licensing by the CRB); id. § 801 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (authorizing the appointment and
function of Copyright Royalty Judges). See generally id. § 111 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a
statutory license in secondary transmissions by cable television systems); id. § 112 (2006)
(establishing a statutory license for ephemeral recordings used to facilitate digital transmissions);
id. § 115 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for the reproduction and
distribution of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works); id. § 118 (2006) (allowing a statutory
license for the use of certain copyrighted works by noncommercial broadcasting entities); id. § 119
(2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for satellite retransmissions to the public
for private viewing); id. § 122 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for satellite
retransmissions of local television stations’ broadcasts into local markets).
122 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1298.
123 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006).
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focused on compulsory licensing issues would help create precedents across
a wide variety of industries, which will help establish a more accurate and
fair system for both patentees and the public. In the process, the expertise
and efficiency inherent in a specialized board would result in lower litigation
costs and greater accuracy for the parties involved.
The board likely would quickly develop expertise in compulsory licensing
and be able to not only efficiently and accurately determine which patents
should be subject to such licensing, but also establish reasonable royalty
rates that represent competitive transactions between willing buyers and
sellers in the marketplace. Following an evidentiary hearing, the board
would determine licensing rates, considering such factors as economic
analysis, expert testimony, past industry practices, past company practices,
prior precedents, and market evidence. Establishing royalty rates based on
percentages of licensee revenue will align the incentives of the patentee and
licensee, ensuring that products are properly and efficiently commercialized.
In addition, a revenue-based model would ensure that licensing fees do not
exceed gross revenues for any interested party.124
Borrowing language from the Bayh–Dole Act,125 the standard used by
the board for determining whether compulsory licensing should be imposed
on a specific patent should be similar to whether the patent holder “has not
taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to
achieve practical application of the subject invention.”126 The focus would be
on the affirmative steps taken by the patentee, the market demand for the
invention, and the public interest in scientific and artistic progress.127 The
determination, however, would not take into account many of the issues,
such as exorbitantly high prices, that are often raised in regard to the
pharmaceutical industry. The main goal of this compulsory licensing system
is to ensure that inventions are properly practiced. In this way, the market—
rather than the patentee—determines when and to what extent new
technologies are incorporated into society.
If a patentee were able to prove sufficient working of the patent to avoid
compulsory licensing—a relatively easy burden under this structure—
124 Such a revenue based–royalty rate model has already been implemented in the copyright
context. See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, 2782
(2002) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 117 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (“Any such agreement
for small commercial webcasters shall include provisions for payment of royalties on the basis of a
percentage of revenue or expenses, or both, and include a minimum fee.”).
125 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 178(j), 17
U.S.C §§ 106, 117, scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. § 5908).
126 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
127 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 434-36 (suggesting a similar solution that focuses on the
anticompetitive use of patents as a prerequisite to compelled licensing).
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judgment would be in her favor. The patentee would then be entitled to
collateral estoppel on the judgment until the next maintenance fee period,
immunizing the patentee from further compulsory license challenges for
alleged nonuse or technology suppression until that date. But should this
determination be made against the patentee, for the remainder of the patent
term, the patentee would be required to license the invention—under a
reasonable royalty rate—to any party that wishes to license the patent.
Essentially, if a patentee is not using the monopoly rights that were given to
her through the patent system, then she should not be entitled to monopoly
profits. The goal is to ensure that the product enters the market to some
extent, whether at the hands of the original patentee, or through compulsory
licensing, which can help ensure both the local working of inventions and
the diffusion of technologies.
This structure would place decisionmaking power in the hands of
experts who can properly analyze the anticompetitive effects of patent
nonuse and give proper weight to the public interest in disclosure, diffusion,
and commercialization of beneficial technologies.128 Flexibility and fairness
in these proceedings will be crucial to ensuring that the incentive structure
for inventors is not severely undermined.
It may take many years to establish reasonable royalty rate frameworks
across a wide array of highly technical industries characterized by rapid
marketplace innovation. The threat of compulsory licensing, however,
should result in a greater number of voluntary licensing arrangements,
providing further evidence of what reasonable and competitive royalty rates
are in a willing buyer-and-seller marketplace. “[T]he key is to strike a
balance by giving enough protection to encourage innovation, but not so
much protection that it imposes excessive social burdens.”129
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has noted that patent law serves a number of purposes:
to incentivize inventors to devote resources to technological development,
to encourage innovation and commercialization of products, and to encourage
disclosure of inventions for the benefit of society.130 The government and
courts, however, have seemingly subordinated the public interest in favor of
inventors’ personal economic interests. Of course, it is difficult to efficiently
achieve all three purposes of patent law without recognizing one as being of
128 See id. at 436 (stating that compulsory licensing would be “more flexible than current
antitrust and patent misuse law”).
129 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1291.
130 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
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higher importance. However, when the Constitution specifically states that
exclusive rights are granted to promote the progress of science and the arts, the
current patent system cannot be said to have properly balanced the inventor’s
incentives and financial interests with the public’s interest in innovation.131
Patents are often “understood as a type of social contract between the
patentee and society.”132 Patent holders are granted limited monopolies in
exchange for the disclosure of their inventions and discoveries, which foster
technological development.133 Yet, while society may expect that a promise
of commercialization exists, or at least that the patentee will provide
reasonable terms for others to use or exploit her inventions, Congress has
adamantly refused to place this burden on patent holders.134
Patent holders are largely permitted to suppress new and beneficial
technologies, depriving society of the benefits of commercialization. When
patents are not worked or technologies are consciously suppressed, however,
courts should declare that the patentee has breached the contract.135
Technological development and efficient use of inventions through market
forces is thwarted when patent owners fail to use, license, or assign
intellectual property rights for the benefit of those individuals and entities
who wish to use or improve upon the technology.
It will not be easy to garner the necessary political and economic support
to implement these proposed changes, but the government should be
permitted to limit a patentee’s exclusive rights by establishing compulsory
licensing when technology has been suppressed or a patent has been unworked.
The patentee would still benefit financially from the reasonable royalty, and
the public would gain earlier use of the invention.136 Compulsory licensing
should only issue when the patent holder has no commercial use for her
exclusive rights or has withheld inventions from the marketplace. By strictly
construing the definitions of nonuse and suppression, compulsory licensing
would not adversely affect the patentee’s incentive to innovate. After all,
131 See Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 272-73 (“The speed of technological change, particularly
in the converging fields of computer software, music, video, television, and communications,
coupled with the power of technology industry lobbying, have left the statutory balance tilted in
favor of rewarding innovators at the expense of further innovation and of consumers.”).
132 Saunders, supra note 30, at 451.
133 Id.
134 See generally Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (noting
that Congress was aware of the policy of penalizing nonuse in other countries, and as yet had
elected not to implement a similar measure in the United States).
135 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1301.
136 See Iden, supra note 108, at 304-05 (“[A]warding only damages—instead of injunctions—
balances the interests of the public in having use of a new invention, while still respecting the
legitimate rights of the unused-patent holder.”).
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economic theory and patent law assume that inventors decide ex ante to
invent to capitalize on their labor and efforts through commercialization of
products and extraction of monopoly profits.137
The Constitution grants Congress the power to decide which inventions
to protect and for how long.138 Therefore, patent rights may be subject to
whatever qualifications and limitations Congress deems necessary.139
Congress should therefore embrace compulsory licensing as a beneficial use
of the power granted to it by the Constitution. By utilizing compulsory
licensing to combat nonworking of patents and technology suppression, the
United States will be better able to provide the proper balance between
inventors’ and the public’s interests. Patentees will still be incentivized to
disclose their inventions and will be compensated for their labor and
investment. More importantly, Congress will ensure that scientific and
artistic progress further flourish in the years ahead.
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See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See generally TRIPS, supra note 11.

